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A Missed Opportunity: How Pakootas v. Teck Cominco




The Trail Smelter, which has operated just north of the U.S.-
Canadian border for more than 100 years, was the basis of a landmark
arbitration decision in international environmental law: the Trail Smelter
Arbitration.1 Years after the decision, however, the lessons that should
have been learned from this historic international compromise have gone
unheeded.
In a water pollution dispute involving the same smelter, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 2 (CERCLA) applied to a Ca-
nadian company's disposal of hazardous waste in Canada. 3 But by char-
acterizing its holding as a domestic application of CERCLA, the court
t J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2009; B.A., Neuroscience and Behavior, Colum-
bia College of Columbia University, 2000. For their exhaustive editing and excellent ideas, I would
like to thank Keith Seo, Carly Summers, and Sarah Lysons. I also thank my dear partner, Aaron
Waldkoetter, who cooked many dinners without complaint while I worked on this article. I dedicate
this article to my mother, Nickie Addis, who is my constant inspiration, sounding board, and emo-
tional support.
1. For a discussion of the Trail Smelter Arbitration, see infra Part IV.C. Briefly, in the 1920s,
Washington farmers brought claims against the Trail Smelter to stop its excessive emissions of sul-
fur dioxide fumes. The dispute was submitted to bilateral arbitration, which ultimately resulted in
the Smelter owing minor damages and being forced to comply with emission caps. See, e.g., Noah
D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 681, 696 (2007) (quoting EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 257 (1998)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
3. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
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avoided discussing the presumption against extraterritorial application of
domestic statutes.4 This presumption discourages courts from asserting
U.S. legislative jurisdiction over foreign persons or conduct, absent legis-
lative intent to the contrary.5 Although the Ninth Circuit did not articu-
late the policy considerations underlying its decision,6 one concern was
that an extraterritorial application of CERCLA could provoke retaliatory
reciprocal application of Canadian environmental laws to pollution ema-
nating from the United States.7
Extraterritorial application of domestic statutes is rarely advisable;
international disputes are better handled internationally. Especially at the
U.S.-Canadian border, a number of international tribunals exist just to
handle international environmental disputes. 8 However, these tribunals
are both ineffective and inaccessible for individual private litigants seek-
ing redress from environmental harms.9 In their present form, these tri-
bunals will most always be rejected in favor of the faster, more accessi-
ble, and more effective domestic court system.10
Because the accessibility and effectiveness of international dispute
resolution systems are unlikely to improve in the near future, courts must
clarify the murky and inconsistent law surrounding the extraterritorial
application of domestic statutes. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit could
have and should have adopted an explicit position regarding when the
extraterritorial application of domestic statutes is proper. Such clarifica-
tion would have both short- and long-term benefits: it would improve
consistency in the application of domestic environmental laws; it would
provide plaintiffs in transboundary disputes with effective remedies; and
it would spur the development of a bilateral dispute resolution system by
which to deal effectively with transboundary pollution issues.
4. Id. at 1073, 1079. The fundamental tenet of the extraterritoriality doctrine is the presump-
tion that domestic statutes are intended to apply only within the boundaries of the United States.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also infra Part lI.D.
5. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 617 (4th ed. 2007).
6. The Ninth Circuit may have also been reluctant to oppose a previous Ninth Circuit decision,
Subafims, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). See infra Part
IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.B. In addition, the application of domestic environmental statutes raises
questions of comity and potential conflicts with the other country's law.
8. The two tribunals most likely to be used in this context are the International Joint Commis-
sion and the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation. See discussion infra Part
IV.C.
9. See infra Part lV.C.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
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Part II of this Note relays the facts surrounding Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco, Ltd.," l gives a brief history of CERCLA and its liability re-
quirements, and then summarizes the reasoning of both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit. Part II also includes an overview of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality and the possible means of rebutting it. Part
III addresses the question of whether the application of CERCLA in Pa-
kootas was in fact extraterritorial and discusses some of the flaws in the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning. After concluding that this was an extraterrito-
rial application of CERCLA, this Part III then examines the Ninth Cir-
cuit's current stance on the extraterritoriality doctrine. Next, Part IV
considers the ways in which the Ninth Circuit might have held the appli-
cation of CERCLA to be extraterritorial in Pakootas without disregard-
ing its existing precedent and then explores the international and policy
considerations that may have been a part of the Ninth Circuit's delibera-
tion. Part IV then discusses the existing problems with the international
dispute resolution avenues available to transboundary pollution plaintiffs,
and concludes with a proposal for a simple solution that will allow
United States and Canadian courts to work hand in hand to develop an
interdependent jurisprudence that will help to equitably address future
transboundary disputes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Summary of the Facts
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, owns and op-
erates the Trail Smelter, one of the world's largest lead and zinc smelt-
ers.12 Located on the Columbia River, about ten river miles north of the
U.S.-Canadian border, 13 the smelter is estimated to have dumped be-
tween 450 and 800 tons of slag into the Columbia River every day until it
stopped routine dumping in 1995.14 Teck Cominco itself estimates that it
dumped between 145,000 and 186,700 tons of slag into the river annu-
11. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
12. See Teck Cominco, Trail Lead Zinc Smelter Operations, http://www.teckcominco.com
(follow the "Operations" link, then select "Trail Operations" in the "Zinc" column) (last visited
April 19, 2009).
13. Upper Columbia River Site, Docket No. CERCLA-10-2004-0018, at 3 (EPA Dec. 11,
2003) (Unilateral Administrative Order for Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/RIO/CLEANUP.NSF/UCR/Enforcement (follow "Text" hyperlink for
Scanned Unilateral Administrative Order) [hereinafter UAO].
14. EPA, Upper Columbia River Site Inspection Report Northeast Washington, TDD: 01-02-
0028, 2.11-13 (2003) [hereinafter EPA Columbia River Report], http://www.epa.gov/rlOearth/of
fices/oec/UCR[Uppe/o20Columbia%2ORiver/o20ESI.pdf.
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ally. 5 To put this number into perspective, until as late as 1994 and
1995, Teck Cominco was "discharging more copper and zinc into the
Columbia River than the cumulative totals of all permitted U.S. dis-
charges for those materials.' 6
Downriver, Washington State's Lake Roosevelt 17 felt the brunt of
the environmental impact.18 This region is a part of the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, and in 1999, the Colville Tribes peti-
tioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct a pre-
liminary assessment of the health and environmental hazards present in
the river and lake.' 9 Not only was the Colville Tribes' request unprece-
dented, 20 the EPA's grant of the petition was a step never before taken:
2'
the EPA had never before issued a Unilateral Administrative Order
22(UAO) to a Canadian company doing no business in the United States.
After assessing the Lake Roosevelt and upper Columbia River site,
the EPA found "contaminants ... including, but not limited to, heavy
metals such as arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, mercury and zinc." 23 In
addition, the EPA "observed the presence of slag, a by-product of the
smelting furnaces, containing glassy ferrous granules and other metals, at
beaches and other depositional areas at the Assessment Area., 24 Com-
pleting the assessment in early 2003, the EPA concluded that, under
CERCLA's Hazard Ranking System, the site was eligible for listing on
the National Priorities List and thus qualified for remedial action. At
15. Id.
16. Karen Dom Steele, B.C. Smelter Dumped Tons of Mercury; Records Show Scope of River
Pollution, SPOKESMAN-REv. (Spokane), June 20, 2004, at Al.
17. Franklin D. Roosevelt Lake is a reservoir in the Columbia River watershed created by the
construction of Grand Coulee Dam. EPA Columbia River Report, supra note 14, at 2-1. It extends
approximately 135 miles up the Columbia River, ending just 15 miles south of the Canadian border.
Id.
18. Because of the dam, the slag that might have otherwise been distributed down the Colum-
bia River is instead trapped in the reservoir. See EPA Columbia River Report, supra note 14, at 2.5-
.6; see also Richard A. Du Bey & Jennifer Sanscrainte, The Role of the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation in Fighting to Protect and Clean-up the Boundary Waters of the United States:
A Case Study of the Upper Columbia River and Lake Roosevelt Environment, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 335, 337 (2004).
19. Letter from Colleen Cawston, Chair, Colville Bus. Counsel, Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, to Chuck Clarke, Reg'l Adm'r, EPA Region 10 (Aug. 5, 1999),
http://www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docsRobinson-Domr/TrailSmelter/docs/ColvillePetitiont
oEPA2AUG 1999.pdf.
20. Du Bey & Sanscrainte, supra note 18, at 359 n.161.
21. Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Dej6 Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental
Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85
B.U. L. REV. 363, 379-80 (2005).
22. Id.
23. UAO, supra note 13, at 2.
24. Id. at 2-3.
25. Id. at 3.
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this point, the EPA and Teck Cominco entered into months of fruitless
negotiations over how to resolve the dispute.26 When the talks finally
broke down, the EPA issued a UAO directing Teck Cominco to conduct
a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) to determine the ex-
tent of the contamination and develop remedial strategies.27
Teck Cominco sought help from the Canadian Government, which
sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. State Department making clear its dis-
approval of the EPA's position: "Canada does not believe that CERCLA
applies to Teck Cominco Metals and is concerned that the issuance of the
Unilateral Administrative Order may set an unfortunate precedent, by
causing transboundary environmental liability cases to be initiated in
both Canada and the United States. 28
Teck Cominco refused to comply with the UAO, 29 and the EPA
showed no inclination to enforce it. As a result, two members of the
Colville Tribes, Joseph A. Pakootas and Donald R. Michel, filed a citizen
suit 30 against Teck Cominco in the Eastern District of Washington. 3'
26. In 2003, after completing its assessments of the site, the EPA initiated informal settlements
talks with Teck Cominco, hoping that Teck would agree to have its American subsidiary, Teck
Cominco American, Inc., perform a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS). See
Letter from David Croxton, Unit Manager, Office of Envtl. Cleanup, EPA Region 10, to Karen
Dunfee, Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Oct. 10, 2003), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/RlO/CLEAN UP.NSF/UCR/Enforcement (follow "Cover Letter for Special
Notice Letter" hyperlink). When these discussions did not progress, EPA triggered formal negotia-
tions via a Special Notice Letter. In response, Teck offered to pay for independent studies, but re-
fused to be a part of a CERCLA proceeding. See Michael J. Robinson-Dom, The Trail Smelter: Is
What's Past Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 268
(2006); see also Matthew Preusch, Pollution Dispute in Northwest Straddles the Border, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A8.
27. Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 268; UAO, supra note 13, at 9-10. The EPA has the
authority, pursuant to § 9606 of CERCLA, to issue Unilateral Administrative Orders that compel the
potentially responsible party to comply with the EPA's directives. To issue such an order, the EPA
need determine only that the basic statutory elements of the violation are present and that the site
may present an "imminent and substantial endangerment." CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 526 (2d ed. 2007).
28. Diplomatic Note from Embassy of Can. to U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 8, 2004),
http://www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docs/Robinson-Dorn/TrailSmelter/docs/TCmemoSupport
ingMotionDismissExhibits.pdf, at 84.
29. See Letter from G. Leonard Manuel, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Teck Cominco Met-
als, Ltd., to Michael F. Gearhead, Dir., Envtl. Cleanup Office, EPA Region 10 (Jan. 12, 2004),
http://www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docs/Robinson-Dom/TrailSmelter/docs/TCm emoSup-
portingMotionDismissExhibits.pdf, at 78-79.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (2000). CERCLA provides states and private parties with the right
to seek enforcement of orders issued by the EPA. Under CERCLA, "any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf.., against any person who is alleged to be in violation of any ...
order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter." Id.
31. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
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B. CERCLA: A Summary
In December 1980,32 Congress enacted CERCLA, the Superfund
Act, to ensure prompt and effective remediation of hazardous waste
sites. 33 The product of last-minute negotiations by a lame-duck Congress,
CERCLA essentially combined three previously proposed bills that no
one could agree on into something that everyone could live with.34 In a
last-ditch effort to get a bill through both houses before the end of its
session and before President-elect Reagan took over,35 Congress cobbled
CERCLA together by adopting language "almost verbatim" from § 311
of the Clean Water Act and lifting the rest from bills amending the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act
3 6 (RCRA). 37
CERCLA is one of the most ambiguous and incomprehensible of
the environmental statutes.3 8 It is said that judges hope that "if they stare
at CERCLA long enough, it will bum a coherent afterimage on the
brain., 39 This degree of ambiguity makes CERCLA's overarching poli-
cies and objectives difficult to interpret. CERCLA is unique among envi-
ronmental statutes in that it lacks even a statement of goals and pur-
poses. 40  Courts, however, have divined two general goals of the Act:
ensuring that hazardous waste sites are adequately cleaned up and ensur-
ing that those responsible for the sites bear the responsibility for reme-
diation.4'
CERCLA is also unique because it is not directly a regulatory stat-
ute.42 Instead, the Act's operation is primarily remedial, kicking in once
32. Congress was spurred by the disastrous and highly publicized Love Canal debacle. See
N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL - PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB, A SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1978), http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/investigat
ions/love _canal/lctimbmb.htm (last visited April 19, 2009).
33. See, e.g., Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982);
see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA under the Remedial Purpose Canon:
Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 203 (1996)
(noting reasons for CERCLA's enactment).
34. See H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (2d Sess. 1980) (containing comprehensive provisions of liability
and compensation for oil spillage damage and removal); H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (2d Sess. 1980) (an
amendment to RCRA that proposed to regulate inactive hazardous waste sites); S. 1480, 96th Cong.
(2d Sess. 1980) (proposing liability for personal injury as well as broad third-party liability); see also
Grad, supra note 33, at 3-7.
35. Grad, supra note 33, at 19-35.
36.42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
37. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 683-84 (2d ed. 1994).
38. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA 's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1405
(1997).
39. Id.
40. RODGERS, supra note 37, at 683.
41. Watson, supra note 33, at 203.
42. RODGERS, supra note 37, at 683-84.
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the regulatory provisions of the RCRA have been violated. 43  Thus,
CERCLA imposes liability on actors who have already violated RCRA
by disposing of hazardous waste. 4 To present a prima facie case under
CERCLA, a party must show that three elements are met: (1) there was
an actual or threatened "release ' 45 of a hazardous substance; (2) the re-
lease was from a "facility"; 46 and (3) the defendant falls within one of the
four categories of "covered persons" 47 subject to liability under
CERCLA.48
C. Pakootas' Path Through the Courts
To determine whether the Lake Roosevelt dispute justified the ap-
plication of CERCLA to Teck Cominco, the district court for the Eastern
District of Washington first examined whether the dispute actually raised
extraterritoriality issues or whether it resulted instead in a purely domes-
tic application of the statute.49 In its analysis, the court emphasized that
the B.C. smelter was the "source of the hazardous substances" 50 but also
noted that Washington State's Lake Roosevelt was the site identified by
the EPA for remediation.5'
For the first element of CERCLA liability, the EPA defined the "re-
leases" at issue as "hazardous substances at the Site or the past, present,
or potential migration of hazardous substances currently located at or
emanating from the Site. ' 2 Thus, the "release" of Teck Cominco's toxic
waste occurred domestically, in Lake Roosevelt. For the second ele-
ment, the EPA specified that the Lake Roosevelt site was a "facility," as
defined in CERCLA,53 from which the release occurred.54
43. Id. at 684.
44. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
45. CERCLA defines "release," in part, as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
46. CERCLA defines "facility," in part, as "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline ... or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located." Id. § 9601(9).
47. The four categories of "covered persons" under CERCLA are "(I) the owner and operator
of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal ... and (4) any person who accepts
or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release." Id. § 9607(a)(4).
48. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2006).
49. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 257898, at *4-5
(E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
50. Id.
51. Id. at *5.
52. UAO, supra note 13, at 5-6.
53. 42 U.S.C. §9601(9) (2006). See CERCLA definition of "facility," supra note 46.
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Although the EPA effectively characterized both the facility and re-
lease as discretely domestic, the district court refused to confine its
analysis to these solely domestic triggers for CERCLA liability." In-
stead, the court pointed to the source of the toxic slag: Teck Cominco's
smelter in British Columbia. 56 The court declined to restrict its extrater-
ritoriality analysis to two of the three requirements for liability under
CERCLA.57 Such a restriction would have ignored the causal link be-
tween Teck Cominco's disposal of the waste into the Columbia River in
Canada and the subsequent release of the hazardous chemicals from the
slag in Lake Roosevelt. 58 The district court refused to rely on the "legal
fiction" that the two events are "wholly separable." 59
Although the district court held that imposing liability on Teck
Cominco necessarily involved an extraterritorial application of
CERCLA, it used what is known as the "effects exception" 60 to deter-
mine that application of the Act was appropriate. 6  The district court
immediately certified the question for appeal to the Ninth Circuit, on the
ground that the case involved "a controlling question of law as to which
there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.,
62
Although it upheld the district court's denial of Teck Cominco's
motion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the extraterritorial application
of CERCLA was not at issue. 63 In its analysis, the court emphasized
CERCLA's role as remedial, rather than regulatory, and noted that the
Act's purview was limited to the cleanup site alone and did not extend to
the conduct that originally created the waste.64 This distinction allowed
the court to rely on the very "legal fiction" rejected by the district court
to find that the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco in this case
was purely domestic.65 Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not deem it necessary
to address whether application of CERCLA required overcoming the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
66
54. UAO, supra note 13, at 5-6.





60. For a general discussion of the "effects exception," see infra Part Il.D.2.b. For analysis of
how that exception is viewed in the Ninth Circuit, see infra Part III.B.
61. Pakootas, 2004 WL 2578982, at *9 (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530
(D.C. Cir. 1993)).
62. Id. at *17.
63. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
64. Id. at 1073, 1077-78.
65. Id. at 1077-79.
66. See id. at 1082.
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Teck Cominco petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision. 67 Although initially evi-
dencing some interest in the case by inviting the U.S. Solicitor General to
68articulate the United States's position on the matter, the Court subse-
quently denied certiorari after the Solicitor General reasoned that the
case was effectively moot.69
D. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of Domestic
Statutes
The extraterritoriality doctrine is jurisdictional at heart; it operates
to control "the authority of a nation to adjudicate the rights of particular
parties and to establish the norms of conduct applicable to events or per-
sons outside its borders. 7 ° United States courts presume that domestic
statutes apply only territorially, that is, only to persons and conduct
within U.S. borders. 71  The advocating party then has the burden of
showing why extraterritorial application of a statute is appropriate. The
Supreme Court has articulated two possible rebuttals, or "exceptions", to
the presumption-congressional intent and domestic adverse effects.7 2
Comity concerns are also relevant; even if adverse effects otherwise re-
but the presumption, statutory application may be improper if such appli-
cation would result in international discord.73  The presumption ensures
67. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakootas, 128 S. Ct. 858
(2008) (No. 06-1188), 2007 WL 621960.
68. See Docket Entry, June 4, 2007, Pakootas, 128 S. Ct. 858 (No. 06-1188).
69. Pakootas, 128 S. Ct. at 858. While the case was pending before the Ninth Circuit, Teck
Cominco entered a settlement with the EPA under which it agreed to perform the RI/FS that was
originally demanded in the UAO. See Settlement Agreement between EPA and Teck Cominco
American, Inc. 1 (June 2, 2006), http://yosemite.epa.gov/RI0/CLEANUP.NSF/UCR/Enforcement
(follow "Agreement for Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study" hyperlink). As a result of this
settlement, the EPA withdrew its UAO. Letter from L. Michael Bogert, Adm'r, EPA Region 10, to
Doug H. Horswill, Senior Vice President, Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (June 2, 2006),
http://www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docs/Robinson-Dorn/TrailSmelter/docs/T eckComin-
coVPakootasPetitionAppendix.pdf, at 120. Although this withdrawal rendered moot the issues of
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, the question of civil penalties for each day that Teck
Cominco failed to comply with the UAO remained ripe. Appellant's Request for Judicial Notice at
8, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-35153). Nonethe-
less, the U.S. Solicitor General in his Amicus Brief for the United States argued that the only issues
before the lower courts-those stemming from Teck Cominco's failure to comply with the UAO-
were moot, and the case thus did not merit present review. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 6, Pakootas, 128 S. Ct. 858 (No. 06-1188), 2007 WL 4142586.
70. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402,403 cmt. g (1987).
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
73. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 532. When congressional intent rebuts the presumption, courts
"assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they
write American laws." See F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65
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that, when a court considers whether to apply a domestic statute abroad,
it also considers both the purpose of the statute and the international
ramifications of extraterritorial application.74
1. Nature and History of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The presumption against extraterritoriality, in its current incarna-
tion, was long in the making. During the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, courts and commentators took a strictly territorial view of U.S.
sovereignty and thus of legislative jurisdiction.75 The presumption was
first applied in some form in the early 1800s. 76 Its most well-known
modem articulation, however, was made by Justice Holmes, writing for
the majority in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 7 7 Since that
case, application of the presumption fell in and out of favor before it was
recently re-adopted in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
("Aramco"). 78 Quoting from the earlier Foley Brothers v. Filardo,79 the
Aramco court enunciated the presumption in its now-classic form:
"[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 80
Two primary purposes underlie the presumption against extraterri-
toriality. 81 First, the presumption "serves to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord., 82 Second, the presumption solidifies the principle
that when Congress creates legislation, "it is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions. 83 These purposes should inform application.
(2004). When a statute is ambiguous, a court will construe it "to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations." See id
74. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 530-31.
75. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 5, at 617. Adherence to the territoriality principle in
the area of legislative jurisdiction during this time mirrored a similar approach to personal jurisdic-
tion and choice of law. Id. at 78-79, 616.
76. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S.
241, 279 (1807); The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1824) (Story, J.) ("The laws of no nation can
justly extend beyond its own territory, except so far as regards its own citizens.").
77. See 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909). Justice Holmes noted that "the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done," and
that this should lead to "the construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power." Id.
78.499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
79. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
80. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
81. ld; see also William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption against Extraterritoriality,
16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 92 (1998); Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based
on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 96 (2006).




Before a court decides whether it should apply a statute extraterrito-
rially, it must first determine whether application of the statute would be
extraterritorial at all. This determination turns on one or both of two fac-
tors: where the regulated conduct or event occurs and where the effects
of that conduct are felt.84 Courts, and even judges within the same cir-
cuit, 85 disagree over which of these factors to use in their determina-
tions. 86 Some courts look only to where the conduct occurred. For ex-
ample, one court stated: "[A]fter identifying the conduct proscribed or
regulated by the particular legislation in question, a court must consider
if that conduct occurred outside of the borders of the U.S. ' 87  Other
courts look only to where the effects are felt.88 And, as well illustrated
by Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey,89 some courts look to either
where the conduct occurred or where the effects were felt. In Pakootas,
the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to clarify which approach district
courts should use. Instead, however, the court obscured the issue by fo-
cusing on a negative: it discussed merely why Teck Cominco's foreign
conduct did not make application of CERCLA extraterritorial. 90
2. Rebutting the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Despite the sweeping scope of the presumption against extraterrito-
riality, two exceptions may rebut the presumption in certain circum-
stances. First, the presumption may be rebutted when clear evidence ex-
ists of a congressional intent for the statute to apply beyond the borders
of the United States. 91 Second, the presumption may be rebutted when
foreign conduct produces "adverse effects" within the United States.
92
i. Congressional Intent
The first exception is built into the presumption itself. The pre-
sumption applies to "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent ap-
84. Dodge, supra note 81, at 88-89.
85. See infra note 89.
86. Dodge, supra note 81.
87. In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d 1036
(2d Cir. 1996).
88. Robinson v. TCVUS West Commc'ns, Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
89. 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Whereas in the D.C. Circuit's Zoelsch decision Judge
Bork adopted a more effects-based analysis, see 824 F.2d at 31, in Massey, Judge Mikva clearly
views the location of both conduct and effects as determinative, see 986 F.2d at 531.
90. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
91. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993).
92. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
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pears." 93 Thus, a domestic statute might overcome the presumption
when congressional intent shows that the statute was meant to apply ex-
traterritorially. Just how clear that showing must be is uncertain. Since
the Aramco decision, the Supreme Court's definition and application of
the presumption have been inconsistent. 94 The Court has continued to
apply the presumption in most of the relevant cases, but its requirements
for the intent necessary to overcome the presumption have become less
strict. 95 Although in Aramco Justice Rehnquist spoke of requiring a
"clear statement" of congressional intent to overcome the presumption,96
more recent cases have downgraded that requirement to "clear evidence"
of such intent.
97
Under either requirement, however, this exception would have little
application in the Pakootas case. CERCLA is a notoriously ambiguous
statute,98 and its legislative history is equally unrevealing. 99 The Act
contains no "clear statement" that extraterritorial application was in-
tended, 100 and one cannot glean this intent even under the less rigid
"clear evidence" standard. 10 1 Moreover, the legislative history does not
show that Congress intended the Act to apply outside of the borders of
the United States. 10 2 Even if Congress might have foreseen the chance
that an extraterritorial application was necessary, that foreseeability
alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption. 10 3 The Supreme Court
has noted that the mere "possibility" that Congress foresaw a potential
for such applicability "is not a substitute for the affirmative evidence of
intended extraterritorial application that our cases require." 10 4  Thus,
there is no clear statement or evidence that Congress intended CERCLA
to apply outside the borders of the United States.
93. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros v.
Filardo., 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
94. See Abate, supra note 81, at 97-98.
95. Id.
96. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258.
97. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (looking to "all available evidence" to discern congressional
intent).
98. Nagle, supra note 38, at 1405.
99. Watson, supra note 33, at 202; see also Grad, supra note 33, at 2.
100. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
101. See Nagle, supra note 38, at 1409-10.
102. See Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 299.




ii. The "Effects" Exception
The years following the Supreme Court's firm embrace of the terri-
toriality principle in American Banana found the presumption falling out
of favor as courts applied increasingly liberal jurisdictional interpreta-
tions of the Sherman Act.1"5 In 1945, in United States v. Aluminum
Company ofAmerica ("Alcoa"), Judge Learned Hand rejected the territo-
rial focus of American Banana, instead finding jurisdiction because the
effects of the defendant's foreign conduct were felt in the United
States. 106 After Alcoa, the presence of domestic effects gradually became
the accepted focus for determining extraterritorial jurisdiction. 0 7 Then,
with Aramco, the Supreme Court applied the territoriality presumption
for the first time in forty years, relegating the effects analysis to a narrow
exception to the presumption.'
0 8
The Aramco opinion discussed a limited circumstance in which the
presumption may be overcome-when the Lanham Trademark Act is
applied to foreign conduct, as illustrated by Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.'°9
Ignoring Alcoa entirely, the Aramco court observed that in Steele the Act
applied to foreign conduct because the "unlawful conduct had some ef-
fects within the United States." 110 Citing statutory language, ' the
Aramco court reasoned that Congress intended the Lanham Act to apply
broadly. 112 Thus, although the Court broached the concept of an effects
exception in Aramco, it characterized the exception applied in Steele as
one based on congressional intent.
Years later, the Court again changed course. In Hartford Fire In-
surance Co. v. California,113 the Court relied on Alcoa to apply the
Sherman Act to insurers in London who had allegedly conspired to make
certain insurance unavailable in the United States.1 14 The Court stated
that the "Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and
105. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 5, at 641.
106. 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
107. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 5, at 642; Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extrater-
ritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1472-74 (2008).
108. See Dodge, supra note 81, at 95.
109. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (discussing
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952)).
110. Id.
111. The Court noted that the Lanham Act defined commerce as "all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress." Id. Because the Constitution permits Congress to "regulate
commerce with foreign Nations," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, the Court concluded that Congress
intended the Lanham Act to apply extraterritorially. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252.
112. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252.
113. 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
114. Id.
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did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."11 5 The
Court based its application of the Sherman Act to foreign actors not on
congressional intent but instead on the existence of the domestic effects
alone.116 Ignoring Aramco and the territoriality presumption, and over a
vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, the Court articulated a broad effects
test that minimized the importance of considering international comity."1
A decade later, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
the Court changed its approach yet again relying on Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in Hartford Fire Insurance to stress the importance of comity when
interpreting the jurisdictional reach of a domestic antitrust statute.
118
Thus far, the "effects" exception-the sole clear exception to the broad
sweep of the presumption against extraterritoriality -has arisen before
the Supreme Court only in the antitrust and trademark arenas.' 19
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area is too inconsistent
to provide meaningful guidance for lower courts. Although many of its
opinions discussing the presumption make clear that the presumption
against extraterritoriality is strong and not easily rebutted, 120 the Court
also affirms that the presumption is just that-a presumption and not a
bright-line rule. 121 The Court's justifications both for the presumption
itself and for the effects exception illustrate that situations do exist when
the extraterritorial application of domestic statutes is justifiable. 122 Since
Aramco, however, the Court has failed to circumscribe the scope of ei-
ther the presumption itself or its permissible exceptions. 123 Moreover,
the Court has failed to clarify the extent to which concerns of interna-
tional comity should be taken into consideration.
Because of this failure, the lower courts have created their own in-
terpretations of the presumption and the ways it may be rebutted.
124
These exceptions mirror the factors that affect finding extraterritoriality
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 798-99; BoRN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 5, at 658 (noting the expansiveness of the
Court's effects test).
118. 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004).
119. See id.; see also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 280 (1952) (addressing the
exception with regard to the Lanham Trademark Act).
120. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991).
121. Id. at 252; Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 795-96.
122. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252.
123. See Abate, supra note 81, at 97.
124. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the
presumption does not apply when either effects or conduct are within the United States); Subafilms,
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (applying the
presumption even where adverse effects occurred in the United States); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that the presumption did not apply when de-
fendants' conduct within the United States permitted the court to exercise jurisdiction).
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in the first place. 125 Some circuits find that domestic laws apply only
when the conduct is also domestic; 126 some find that domestic laws apply
whenever there are adverse effects within the United States; 127 and some
find that domestic laws apply when either the conduct or the effects oc-
cur in the United States. 128 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey,
the D.C. Circuit adopted this latter view when applying the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) to the National Science Foundation's
activities in Antarctica.129 The court noted: "[T]he presumption is gener-
ally not applied where the failure to extend the scope of the statute to a
foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the United States."'3 °
Perhaps in part due to its clarity, the Massey court's discussion of the
extraterritoriality doctrine has become "a focal point for other lower
courts' discussions of the presumption.
'31
Thus, although the Supreme Court has applied the "effects" excep-
tion only in the areas of antitrust and trademark, 132 case law evidences an
overall trend in the direction of wider extraterritorial application of do-
mestic laws where effects are felt in the United States, both by the Su-
preme Court and among lower courts.
13 3
3. Comity Concerns in Rebutting the Presumption
The Massey court noted the importance of determining whether ex-
traterritorial application of a domestic statute "would create a potential
for 'clashes between our laws and those of other nations."" 134 Lower
courts generally agree that comity is important but disagree how it
125. Because extraterritoriality may be found based on the location of the regulated conduct, or
on the location of the effects of the conduct, or on both, the factors that can rebut the presumption
will be those same elements.
126. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
127. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Robinson v.
TCI/US West Commc'ns, Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997).
128. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
129. Id. at 529.
130. Id. at 531. It was Massey's interpretation of when the presumption should or should not
apply that the district court in Pakootas relied upon to find that the presumption did not apply in that
case. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982, at *9
(E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004). However, because the Pakootas case arose from the adverse effects that
Teck Cominco's conduct caused in Washington, the presumption against extraterritoriality could
have yielded to any approach accounting for those adverse effects. Although the Ninth Circuit's
position is not at all clear, there is some indication that it has rejected "adverse effects" as a valid
rebuttal of the presumption. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
131. Dodge, supra note 81, at 105.
132. See id.; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
133. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Steele, 344 U.S. at
280; Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
134. 986 F.2d at 532 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
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should be considered when determining the propriety of applying a do-
mestic law extraterritorially. 135 Some commentators argue that the ef-
fects exception itself disserves international comity by permitting unre-
strained exercise of jurisdiction and in fact encouraging courts to apply
domestic statutes abroad. 136 Appellate courts have worked to temper the
broad grant of jurisdiction offered by Alcoa's version of the effects ex-
ception by requiring lower courts to analyze comity concerns. 137 How-
ever, there has been little consistency to these attempts, and in Pakootas,
the Ninth Circuit unwisely deflected its most recent opportunity to con-
sider these questions.
III. ANALYSIS
The court's failure to address extraterritoriality in Pakootas is not
entirely surprising. The Ninth Circuit's previous consideration of the
extraterritoriality doctrine left unresolved the question of when, if ever,
the effects exception applies to the presumption.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Faulty Analysis in Pakootas
By rejecting the district court's finding of extraterritoriality in Pa-
kootas, the Ninth Circuit wrongly concluded that the statute's application
was purely domestic. The court reasoned that because Teck Cominco's
foreign "arrangement for disposal" of the toxic slag was not prohibited or
regulated by CERCLA, its conduct was not relevant to the extraterritori-
ality determination. However, the court mistook a liability requirement
for unregulated conduct. Had it considered Teck Cominco's foreign dis-
posal of the waste, the court would have properly concluded that the ap-
plication of CERCLA to that conduct was extraterritorial.
1. The Pakootas Court's Analysis
As the district court did below, the Ninth Circuit quickly concluded
that two of the three conditions on which CERCLA liability depends
were solely domestic. 138 Therefore, whether application of CERCLA in
135. Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976)
(adopting an interest-balancing "rule of reason" by which international comity is considered), with
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 948-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the interest-
balancing approach due to application difficulties).
136. Parrish, supra note 107, at 1478-79; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 5, at 573 (pondering
whether the effects exception permits "almost limitless legislative jurisdiction").
137. See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15.
138. To present a prima facie case under CERCLA, a party must show that three elements are
met: (1) there was an actual or threatened "release" of a hazardous substance; (2) the release was
from a "facility"; and (3) the defendant falls within one of the four categories of "covered persons"
who are subject to liability under CERCLA. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d
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this case was extraterritorial depended on the final condition for
CERCLA liability: Teck Cominco's status as a "covered person."
1 39
Teck Cominco fell under the subsection of "covered person[s]" that im-
poses liability on "any person" who "arranged for disposal" of hazardous
waste.1 40 As a result, the court examined whether the correct interpreta-
tion of "any person" encompassed foreign actors and whether "arrang-
ing" for disposal of waste was conduct "regulated" by CERCLA, thus
rendering application of the statute to Teck Cominco extraterritorial.
14 1
Teck Cominco argued that the phrase "any person" in § 9607(a)(3)
should not be interpreted to include foreign persons, analogizing a Su-
preme Court interpretation of the phrase "any court" to refer solely to
domestic courts.142 Noting that this interpretation was based in part on
United States v. Palmer,143 the Ninth Circuit adopted the test set out in
Palmer to determine whether "any person" should apply to foreign per-
sons.144 The Palmer test has two components: (1) the forum court must
have jurisdiction over the party, and (2) the legislature must have in-
tended the term or phrase to apply to that party. 45 In this case, the forum
court clearly had specific personal jurisdiction over Teck Cominco.1
46
In its analysis under the second Palmer component, the court used
the statutory text to show that Congress intended CERCLA to apply
when a release or threatened release affects the environment of the
United States. 147 Thus, the person responsible for that domestic release
is included in the phrase "any person," whether that person is located in
the United States or in a foreign country. This emphasis on the location
of the release, rather than the location of the actor, shows not only that it
is the effects of the disposal rather than the cause that are important, but
also that the identity and location of the person responsible for the re-
lease do not matter for purposes of CERCLA liability. It is truly any
person who can be a responsible party.
1066, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2006). The court agreed that the "release"--the leaching of hazardous mate-
rials from the slag at the site-was solely domestic, and that the "facility"-the Lake Roosevelt
site-was entirely within the United States. Id. at 1074-75.
139. See id. at 1073-74.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006).
141. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1076-77.
142. Id. at 1076 (citing Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390-91 (2005)).
143. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
144. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1076.
145. Id.
146. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982
(E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
147. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1077 (quoting CERCLA's definition of "environment" and noting
that CERCLA's drafters clearly intended the Act to apply when effects are felt in the United States).
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The court likely had an ulterior motive for its complicated analysis.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning, as the court itself acknowledged, bore a
striking similarity to the "adverse effects" test often used to find an ex-
ception to the presumption against extraterritorial application of a do-
mestic statute. 148 This similarity was probably the reason the Palmer test
was used in the first place-to set up the distinction the Ninth Circuit
wanted to emphasize. The court stressed the difference between situa-
tions in which the underlying cause of the domestic effects creates an
extraterritorial application issue and situations in which the underlying
cause of the domestic effects triggers no liability and so creates no extra-
territoriality issue. 149 The court contrasted the Pakootas situation with
that in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., in which the Supreme Court held that
the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply when the defen-
dant's liability-creating conduct took place in Mexico. 50 The Ninth Cir-
cuit observed that in Steele, application of the Lanham Act to the defen-
dant was extraterritorial because the very conduct prohibited by the Act
took place in a foreign country; in contrast, under CERCLA, there is no
prohibited conduct.151 The liability-creating event took place in the
United States.152 The court's ability to distinguish Pakootas rode entirely
on its characterization of "arranging for disposal" as both occurring be-
fore the attachment of CERCLA liability and as being conduct unregu-
lated by the Act.
After concluding that Teck Cominco could be "any person" for the
purposes of CERCLA, the court examined the subsection of "covered
person[s]" under which Teck Cominco fell, § 9607(a)(3).153 That section
states that the company must have "otherwise arranged for disposal ...
of hazardous substances. 154 For Teck Cominco to fall under this cate-
gory, certain conduct was necessary: Teck Cominco must have "arranged
for disposal" of its waste. 55 Although Teck Cominco argued that it was
not an arranger under CERCLA, the court rejected this argument. 56 The
court reasoned that because arranging for disposal of hazardous sub-
stances is "neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA,... [t]he
location where a party arranged for disposal or disposed of hazardous
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (contrasting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1952)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1077-78.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006).
155. Id.
156. Teck Cominco disputed that it met this definition of "covered persons." See Pakootas,
452 F.3d at 1075; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 18-21. Its reasons for this dis-
pute fall outside the scope of this Note.
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substances is not controlling for purposes of assessing whether CERCLA
is being applied extraterritorially."'' 57 By adopting this view, however,
the court disregarded the fact that one of the events creating CERCLA
liability, Teck Cominco's disposal of the waste, occurred outside of the
United States.
2. Flaws in the Pakootas Court's Reasoning
The issue of extraterritoriality thus turns in part on whether
CERCLA's requirement that a covered person "arrange[] for disposal"
stands on equal footing with the other two requirements. 158 The events
satisfying each of the three requirements for CERCLA liability are
equally necessary-yet insufficient standing alone-to establish liability.
The Pakootas court, however, neglected to view CERCLA liability as a
whole. The court concluded that because arranging for disposal neither
triggers nor is sufficient for CERCLA liability, the location of the dis-
posal (or arrangement thereof) is not relevant in determining whether
CERCLA applies extraterritorially. 59  Because liability did not attach
until the release occurred, the location of conduct occurring before that
point did not affect the extraterritoriality determination. 1
60
CERCLA liability is, however, established in the opposite se-
quence. A "release" from a "facility" cannot itself create liability when
no "covered person" caused that release. 161 Thus, the potentially respon-
sible party must attain the status of "covered person" before CERCLA
liability can attach.162 The chronological order of the elements establish-
ing CERCLA liability casts doubt on the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
no event before the "release" was relevant to an extraterritoriality analy-
sis. For example, no court would disregard the validity of a contract just
because liability did not arise for its breach until one party defaulted.
Likewise, the Pakootas court should not have disregarded the location of
Teck Cominco's disposal of hazardous waste just because the release
was the final requirement for CERCLA liability.
157. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1078.
158. For Teck Cominco to be liable under CERCLA, there must have been an actual or threat-
ened "release" of a hazardous substance; the release must have come from a "facility"; and Teck
Cominco must have "arranged for disposal" of the hazardous substance. Id. at 1073-74, 77-78.
159. See id at 1078.
160. Id.
161. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 15; see also Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner, Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., v. Pakootas, 128 S. Ct. 858 (2008) (No. 06-1188), 2007 WL
1453850. Although a release triggers CERCLA liability if the party causing the release is a "cov-
ered person," a release caused by a non-covered person will not create liability. As Teck Cominco
aptly notes, CERCLA does not create "'a liability' in the abstract." See Petition for Writ of Certiori-
ari, supra note 67, at 15.
162. Petition for Writ of Certioriari, supra note 67, at 15.
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because CERCLA is a strict-
liability, remedial (rather than a regulatory) statute designed to effect
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, it is the location of the site to be reme-
diated that matters for the determination of extraterritoriality, not the lo-
cation of the responsible party or the disposal. 163 By adhering to this
somewhat artificial distinction, the court oversimplified the relationship
between the remedial and regulatory statutes and failed to put CERCLA
in the broader context of environmental law. 1
64
Generally, when the location of conduct plays a role in the determi-
nation of extraterritoriality, that conduct must be regulated or unlawful
under the statute at issue to play a role in the analysis. 165 Thus, whether
application of CERCLA in Pakootas was extraterritorial may depend on
whether the liability-creating conduct can be said to be "regulated." As
the court noted, CERCLA is not an inherently regulatory statute; instead,
it imposes cleanup costs on the party responsible for a "release.' 66 Be-
cause the statute does not directly regulate the conduct leading up to that
release, the conduct that ultimately creates CERCLA liability-
"arranging for disposal" in this case-may be legal. 67 It is this interpre-
tation of "arranging for disposal" on which the Ninth Circuit relied to
find a solely domestic application of the statute. 168 Nonetheless, techni-
cally regulated or not, "arranging for disposal" was a necessary compo-
nent of Teck Cominco's liability under CERCLA; a party must also be a
"covered person" for liability to attach. 69
The question therefore becomes whether liability-creating conduct
is equivalent to regulated conduct for purposes of finding the application
of a statute to be extraterritorial. The two seem to be functionally
equivalent. One of the many purposes of regulating potentially environ-
mentally hazardous conduct in the first place is to compel those affected
by the regulation to comport with the imposed guidelines. 70 This com-
pulsion is typically achieved by instilling a fear of repercussions-
usually financial ones-in the regulated party.'17  CERCLA acts on dis-
163. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006); see also Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1078 n. 18.
164. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Brit-
ish Columbia in Support of Petitioner at 10, Pakootas, 128 S. Ct. 858 (No. 06-1188), 2007 WL
1318989 [hereinafter Brief of British Columbia].
165. See supra Part II.D.I; see also Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc'ns, Inc., 117 F.3d 900,
905-07 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing the "conduct" test applied by the Second Circuit).
166. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1073.
167. Id. at 1078.
168. Id.
169.42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006).
170. See JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 27, at 5.
171. Regulatory statutes often include provisions authorizing punitive fines or penalties for a
party's failure to comply with the regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c)-(e).
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posers of waste in a similar fashion. 172 Although the Act does not lay out
explicit guidelines that parties must abide, in its effects it does just that.
Both by imposing cleanup costs on disposers whose conduct results
in a release 173 and by virtue of its punitive repercussions, 174 CERCLA
effectively imposes certain "guidelines" on the way in which parties dis-
pose of hazardous waste. Although this type of "regulation" is much
looser than the more typical "command-and-control" regulation, 175 it
achieves a similar end: the conformation of parties' conduct to certain
pre-determined objectives. 176 Therefore, although the Act may not in-
volve the same detailed directives by which disposers must abide, it ef-
fectively regulates the conduct of those parties in ways similar to more
traditional regulatory statutes, like the RCRA.1
77
In contrast, the Pakootas court portrayed the two statutes as the op-
posite sides of a coin: "RCRA regulates the generation and disposal of
hazardous waste, whereas CERCLA imposes liability to clean up a site
when there are actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances into
the environment."' 78 Therefore, in the court's view, it is the "Canadian
equivalent of RCRA, not CERCLA, that regulates how Teck [Cominco]
disposes of its waste within Canada." 179 By creating this type of bright
line between RCRA's regulation and CERCLA's remediation, the court
justified its finding that this application of CERCLA was purely domes-
tic. However, such a distinction oversimplifies the relationship between
the two statutes. 180  Although in most instances CERCLA "picks up
where RCRA leaves off" 8' when all requirements for liability occur
within the United States, the same is not necessarily true when one of the
requirements for CERCLA liability occurs extraterritorially. CERCLA
imposes liability on a party in part because of that party's activities, ei-
ther in simply owning the facility at which the waste was disposed, or, as
in this case, in arranging for the disposal of the waste. If those activities
172. CERCLA provides for civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day when the responsible party
fails to comply with a UAO, see id. § 9609(b), and also provides for punitive damages of up to three
times the amount of the costs incurred by the agency. See id. § 9607(c)(3). See also RODGERS, supra
note 37, at 690.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(AHD).
174. See supra note 172. The deterrent effect of these repercussions controls parties' behavior;
if a party fears that it may have to pay to clean up its mess, it will likely act with greater care in the
future.
175. JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 27, at 6.
176. See id. at 522-23.
177. RODGERS, supra note 37, at 531, 683-84.
178. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006).
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Brief of British Columbia, supra note 164, at 10.
181. RODGERS, supra note 37, at 684 (quoting R. Stoll, The New RCRA Cleanup Regime:
Comparisons and Contrasts with CERCLA, 44 Sw. L.J. 1299 (1991)).
2009] 1031
Seattle University Law Review
took place outside of the United States, then CERCLA would be impos-
ing liability as a result of foreign conduct, a paradigmatic instance of ex-
traterritorial application of a domestic statute.
The Ninth Circuit undertook a convoluted analysis to show that the
application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco was purely domestic. 8 2 No
amount of complexity, however, could obscure that one of the necessary
components of CERCLA liability is the determination that Teck
Cominco was a "covered person." This determination necessarily turned
on Teck Cominco's conduct in a foreign country. Because Teck
Cominco's CERCLA liability rested in part on its conduct in Canada,
and because that conduct may be effectively characterized as being
"regulated" by CERCLA, the imposition of liability on Teck Cominco is
an example of extraterritorial application of domestic law.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Ambiguous Position on Extraterritoriality
The Ninth Circuit's approach to the extraterritoriality doctrine is in-
consistent. First, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, the
court used a version of the effects exception to conclude that the
Sherman Act should apply to a foreign corporation. 183 Then, in
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, Inc., the court altered
its previous reasoning by minimizing the adverse effects question and
focusing instead on congressional intent and the prevention of interna-
tional discord. 184 Finally, in Pakootas, the court obscured the issue en-
tirely by reasoning that the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco is
a domestic application, thus not triggering the presumption against terri-
toriality. 185 Not only did the Pakootas court fail to clarify the circuit's
existing case law, it also undertook flawed reasoning to reach its conclu-
sion.
1. Timberlane: The Rule of Reason
In Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on Alcoa's effects
exception to create a three-part test to determine when a domestic anti-
trust statute should be applied extraterritorially. 86 Although the court
agreed with the Second Circuit that such laws might in some cases apply
to foreign conduct, it tried to place some check on the broad extraterrito-
rial application permitted by the Alcoa test.' 87 This check, characterized
182. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079.
183. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
184. 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994).
185. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079.
186. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609, 613.
187. Id. at 609, 613-15.
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by the Timberlane court as a "jurisdictional rule of reason," required
courts to balance the interests of the forum state with those of the foreign
sovereignty. 188 The rule of reason asks whether extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is appropriate "as a matter of international comity and fairness."'189
Thus, a court should first determine whether the foreign conduct had, or
was intended to have, an effect within the United States. Next, a court
should determine whether that effect was sufficiently substantial to jus-
tify the assertion of jurisdiction. Finally, a court should determine
whether jurisdiction is appropriate in light of comity considerations 9 °
Although it required a consideration of comity concerns, the Timberlane
approach gave a court broad discretion to determine when extraterritorial
jurisdiction is proper. The Timberlane rule of reason influenced the way
in which other courts viewed extraterritorial jurisdiction and the inquiry
required to approve it.'
9 1
188. Id. at 613-15. This balancing requires a court to weigh a series of factors: (1) the degree
of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations
or principal places of businesses or corporations; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere; (5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce; (6) the foreseeability of such effect; and (7) the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. Id. at 614.
In addition, a court should consider the difference between United States and foreign law or policy
to determine whether they actually conflict. Id.
This inquiry is very similar to the inquiry laid out in the Restatement, which states that the
reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be determined by a consideration of the following
factors: (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between
that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to
which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to
which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict
with regulation by another state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403
(1987).
189. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
190. Id.
191. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d Cir. 1979); see also F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (citing Hartford Fire Ins.,
509 U.S. at 817) (approving of Justice Scalia's dissent in Hartford Fire, which in turn relied in part
on Timberlane).
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2. Subafilms: A Retreat to Territoriality
Almost twenty years after Timberlane's approval of the effects ex-
ception, the Ninth Circuit reversed course by minimizing the importance
of adverse domestic effects and instead emphasizing the territoriality
principles espoused in Aramco. Subafilms involved the domestic au-
thorization by MGM/United Artists (MGM/UA) of the international dis-
tribution of the videocassette recording of the movie Yellow Subma-
rine.19 2 Because the conduct creating liability, the distribution of the
video, took place outside of the United States, that conduct was not
reachable by the domestically limited Copyright Act. 
193
The Subafilms court eschewed the effects exception as a stand-
alone rebuttal to the presumption against extraterritoriality.' 94 In doing
so, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, which relied on Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, that the Act should be applied ex-
traterritorially because of the potentially wide-ranging adverse effects on
the American film industry.' 95 Dismissing as mere dicta the discussion
of the "effects" exception in Massey, the court first emphasized that the
"ultimate touchstone" of extraterritoriality is congressional intent.1 96 If a
court cannot interpret either the legislative history or the statutory lan-
guage as permitting extraterritorial application, such application is pro-
hibited.1 97 Second, extraterritorial application of the statute was inappro-
priate because alternative remedies existed by which no such application
was necessary. 198  Finally, the court found determinative the Massey
court's "concession" that the presumption is "particularly appropriate"
when it protects against "clashes between our laws and those of other
nations.' 199 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "because an
192. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1994). As
the original producers of the film, Subafilms, Ltd. and the Hearst Corporation sued MGM/UA, con-
tending that the distribution of the video constituted copyright infringement under the Copyright
Act. Id. Noting that liability under the Copyright Act arises not from the authorization for distribu-
tion but rather from the distribution itself, and that the distribution took place outside of the United
States, the Subafilms court held that authorization alone could not trigger liability for copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act. Id. at 1090.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 1096.
195. Id. at 1095. In concluding that the presumption against extraterritoriality could be over-
come, the district court in Pakootas referenced the "adverse effects" exception articulated in Massey.
See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 257898, at *6 (E.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531(D.C. Cir. 1993)). In
its discussion of Massey, however, the district court glossed over the negative treatment that case
received in Subafilms. See id. at *8-9; Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096-97.
196. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
197. Id. at 1095.
198. Id. at 1095 n.10.
199. Id. at 1097.
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extension of the extraterritorial reach of the Copyright Act ... would in
all likelihood disrupt the international regime" of intellectual property
protection, such an extension would be inappropriate.200 Thus, although
the court did not explicitly reject Massey's "adverse effects" exception, it
created a very high standard for rebutting the presumption.
Subafilms dealt specifically with the Copyright Act, but the case is
nonetheless the best authority available for district courts in the Ninth
Circuit when deciding whether the presumption may be overcome z.20
The district court in Pakootas sought to harmonize the effects exception
from Massey with the comity-based approach in Subafilms, implicitly
advocating a return to a Timberlane-style analysis. 202 Noting the
Subafilms court's emphasis on the prevention of international discord,
the district court concluded that the presumption must not apply because
no such threat of discord was evident in Pakootas.2 °3 However, the dis-
trict court failed to consider Subafilms' "ultimate touchstone" of extrater-
ritoriality: whether there is evidence of congressional intent that
CERCLA apply extraterritorially.20 4 The court's failure to consider this
factor was understandable; there is no evidence that CERCLA was in-
tended to apply outside U.S. borders.
20 5
No subsequent cases have altered the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
20of the effects exception. 06 Therefore, although inconsistent in some re-
spects and decidedly ambiguous in others, the Ninth Circuit's current
position seems to be that the effects exception is not a stand-alone rebut-
tal to the presumption against extraterritoriality. 0 7 Nevertheless, the
Subafilms court left unanswered the question of when, if ever, the excep-
tion may apply.
200. Id. at 1098.
201. Although there have been more recent cases dealing with the question of extraterritorial-
ity, Subafilms, as an en bane decision, is the controlling authority on the question. See Hart v. Mas-
senari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2001).
202. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 04-CV-256-AAM, 2004 WL 257898, at
*8-9 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
203. Id. at *9.
204. See id at *8-9; Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
205. See Nagle, supra note 38, at 1405.
206. Although there has been a more recent Ninth Circuit decision specifically referencing the
Massey exception, the case does not clearly alter the Ninth Circuit's position from that evidenced in
Subafilms; the court found explicit congressional intent for the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, so there was no need for it to reach the question of whether the presumption could
be rebutted using the adverse effects exception. See In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, as a panel decision, the Simon court had no authority to overturn the Subafilms decision.
See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171-74 (discussing the "binding authority" created by en banc proceedings).
207. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096-97.
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IV. PROPOSALS
Despite the ambiguous law in the Ninth Circuit, the Pakootas court
had an alternative that would have upheld Subafilms while still clarifying
the extraterritoriality doctrine in the circuit. This alternative would have
also permitted the court to lucidly analyze concerns of international com-
ity and reciprocity. Because international tribunals are not presently vi-
able sources of redress for injured parties, the Ninth Circuit should have
adopted a narrow version of the effects exception. Although the excep-
tion is not a long-term solution, it both permits plaintiffs the chance for
immediate remedy and provides incentive for the two nations to develop
a workable dispute resolution system in the future.
A. Subafilms Permitted the Pakootas Court to Find Extraterritoriality
Given the ambiguous nature of its case law on the topic, the Ninth
Circuit in Pakootas had an inviting opportunity to clarify by either ex-
plicitly embracing or rejecting the effects exception. In addition to so-
lidifying the Ninth Circuit's stance, an unambiguous holding in this area
would have helped to resolve some of the current disagreement among
the circuits regarding the presumption and its various exceptions.2 °8
However, in light of the existing precedent in the Ninth Circuit,209 the
Pakootas court's holding is not surprising. By characterizing the appli-
cation of CERCLA to Teck Cominco as domestic, 210 the Ninth Circuit
avoided following Subafilms and denied the plaintiffs recovery. It also
avoided a decision explicitly opposing the Subafilms position.
The court had a third option that would have averted either result:
by distinguishing Subafilms and limiting that case to its facts, the Ninth
Circuit could have avoided its tortured analysis of CERCLA, properly
found that the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco was extraterri-
torial, and used the adverse effects exception to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Such an approach would have made for a
clearer opinion that remained consistent with Subafilms.
Before incapacitating the adverse effects exception, the Subafilms
court showed its skepticism toward the argument that there would be a
"disastrous effect on the American film industry." 211 The court empha-
sized a number of alternative remedies available to the plaintiffs that did
208. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the
presumption does not apply when either effects or conduct are within the United States); Subafilms,
24 F.3d at 1097 (applying the presumption even where adverse effects occurred in the United
States); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991).
209. Subafllms, 24 F.3d 1088.
210. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
211. Subafllms, 24 F.3d at 1095.
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not require the extension of the Copyright Act to extraterritorial acts.212
Had "disastrous" effects been unavoidable, as they were in Pakootas 213
the court would have probably been more accommodating of the adverse
effects exception. In this vein, the Pakootas court, in an effort to distin-
guish Subafilms, might have limited the Subafilms holding to those situa-
tions in which the feared adverse effects may be remedied by some other
means.
Furthermore, in Subafilms, the Ninth Circuit did not outrightly re-
ject Massey's effects exception; the court merely conditioned the excep-
tion upon a sufficient finding of congressional intent. Considerable case
law explicitly precluded extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act,
and the legislative and textual history of the Act also strongly evidenced
a congressional intent for the Act to retain a solely domestic reach.214
The history and text of CERCLA tell a much more ambiguous
story,215 but some interpretations of the Act tend to lean in favor of extra-
territorial application.21 6 There is no case law specifically addressing
whether CERCLA applies beyond the border of the United States, but at
least one case suggests that such application would be appropriate in cer-
tain situations. 217 Although neither CERCLA's text nor its legislative
history suggest that the Act was intended to apply outside of national
boundaries,218 Congress did intend to ensure adequate remediation of
waste sites within United States borders. 219 The application of the Act to
Teck Cominco, whose conduct occurred in Canada but caused adverse
effects within the United States, is arguably consistent with this congres-
212. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs could have sought redress through breach of con-
tract actions or by bringing suit under foreign copyright laws. Id.
213. In the Pakootas situation, many of those adverse effects had already occurred. See Du
Bey & Sanscrainte, supra note 18, at 348-50. Because of the health risks presented by Teck
Cominco's dumping, it was important that the Tribes achieve a remediation agreement as soon as
possible. Id. at 365-66.
214. Subafllms, 24 F.3d at 1095-96.
215. See Grad, supra note 33, at 1; Watson, supra note 33, at 202; Nagle, supra note 38, at
1409-10.
216. See, e.g., Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 298-99.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Ivey, 747 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Mich. 1990). In Ivey, the plain-
tiff sought to recover the costs it incurred cleaning up a Michigan Superfund Site. Id. at 1235. The
defendant corporation was owned and operated by Canadian citizens, in Canada. Id. The court held
that Michigan's long-arm statute gave the court personal jurisdiction over the Canadian defendants.
Id. at 1240. The Ontario Court of Appeal subsequently upheld the judgment. United States v. Ivey,
[1991] 26 O.R.3d 533. It noted that "the judgments at issue ... go no further than holding [the Ca-
nadian defendants] to account for the cost of remedying the harm their activity has caused." Parrish,
supra note 21, at 402 (quoting Ivey, 26 O.R.3d at 549). However, Ivey is a clearer case: the defen-
dants' harmful conduct took place within the United States.
218. See Nagle, supra note 38, at 1409-10.
219. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 33, at 203.
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sional intent. 220 Therefore, the text and history of CERCLA do not
clearly preclude extraterritorial application.221
When this ambiguity as to congressional intent exists, the Subafilms
holding carries less force.222 The Subafilms court left room for extraterri-
toriality when a statute's legislative history does not preclude such appli-
cation. This ambiguity prompts consideration of other factors: whether
there are likely to be adverse effects felt within the United States if
CERCLA were not applied extraterritorially, and whether an extraterrito-
rial application of CERCLA would conflict with international or Cana-
dian law. Thus, by distinguishing Subafilms and limiting that case to its
application of the Copyright Act, the Pakootas court had the leeway to
apply CERCLA to Teck Cominco without flying in the face of the
Subafilms holding.
B. Concerns of Comity and Reciprocity
Although the Ninth Circuit in Pakootas could have concluded that
the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco was extraterritorial with-
out disregarding Subafilms, the court could not ignore concerns of inter-
national comity and potential reciprocal extraterritorial application of
Canadian environmental laws. As the Subafilms court observed, con-
gressional intent is not the only factor for a court to consider when decid-
ing whether a domestic statute should apply extraterritorially.223 Equally
important is the prevention of "clashes" between the laws of the United
States and other countries.224
International comity concerns affect a court's analysis in different
ways. In international choice-of-law questions, determining which coun-
try's law to apply is often made by looking first to see whether there is a
"true conflict" between the laws of the two countries. 225 This determina-
tion is also pertinent to the question of whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality should apply.226 Comity considerations, however, are
relevant not only when there is a conflict between domestic and foreign
law, but also when differences between domestic and international policy
220. Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 298-99.
221. Compare id., with Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097
(9th Cir. 1994).
222. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
223. Id at 1097.
224. Id.
225. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also Robin-
son-Dorn, supra note 26, at 309.
226. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
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are sufficient so that international discord could result from the statute's
extraterritorial application.22 7
The Ninth Circuit in Subafilms found this question to be "decisive
in the case of the Copyright Act," fully justifying "application of the
Aramco presumption., 228 The court concluded that, given the potential
for international discord if American copyright laws were applied extra-
territorially, it was "inappropriate for the courts to act in a manner that
might disrupt Congress's efforts to secure a more stable intellectual
property regime. 229 Similarly, whether application of CERCLA to Teck
Cominco in this case would result in a clash between United States and
Canadian environmental law and policy is a key consideration when de-
termining whether the effects exception should be extended to the appli-
cation of CERCLA in this case.
In Pakootas, the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco does
not seem to present a conflict with Canadian environmental laws. Teck
Cominco's operation of the Trail Smelter is regulated under Canada's
equivalent to CERCLA, the Environmental Management Act (EMA)
230
and by the Contaminated Sites Regulation. 231 The EMA was modeled
after CERCLA, and notably, it permits the provincial authority to "issue
a remediation order to any responsible person." 232 Moreover, under the
EMA, Teck Cominco would be "absolutely, retroactively, and jointly and
separately liable to any person or governmental body for reasonably in-
curred costs of remediation. '233
One of the significant differences between the two laws is that, un-
der the EMA, a valid Canadian permit to discharge waste is not a shield
to liability.23 4 If Teck Cominco were being sued by Canadian citizens, a
permit would not protect it from liability; thus, why should it be pro-
tected when its discharge crosses the border into and causes damage in
the United States? The denial of liability in such an instance creates the
most destructive type of border shield.
227. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 5, at 672; Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165-68 (2004) (refusing to apply a domestic statute extraterritorially when no
true conflict existed but when the foreign policies regarding appropriate remedies might be very
different).
228. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097.
229. Id.
230. R.S.B.C., ch. 53 (2003), http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/E/03053_00. htm.
231. B.C. Reg. 375/96 (2005), http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/reg/E/EnvMgmt/EnvMgmt375
96/375 96 00.htm.
232. R.S.B.C., ch. 53, §§ 41, 48.
233. Id. § 47(1).
234. Compare id § 47(4)(a)-(b), with 42 U.S.C. § 96070) (2006).
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Moreover, Canadian federal law 235 is also consistent with the appli-
cation of CERCLA to Teck Cominco. The Canadian Supreme Court
adopted the "polluter pays" principle and has applied it in many Cana-
dian environmental cases.236 There is little identifiable conflict between
U.S. and Canadian law on the question of whether a polluter should fund
the clean-up of its waste.2 37 Thus, this lack of conflict is yet another fac-
tor in favor of overcoming the presumption in the Pakootas case.
In addition to comity considerations, the Ninth Circuit may have at-
tempted to avoid potential problems of reciprocity by concluding that the
application of CERCLA was domestic. Although none of these consid-
erations was directly addressed,238 the concern of reciprocal application
of Canadian environmental laws to pollution originating in the United
States is not a threat to ignore.239 As much pollution-whether water or
air---comes to Canada from the United States as flows the other way.
240
The concern of retaliatory litigation spurred numerous groups to file
amicus briefs opposing the application of CERCLA in the Pakootas
case. 24 1 Moreover, although Canadian courts are willing in certain in-
235. Like law in the United States, Canadian law may be either federal or provincial. See Brief
of British Columbia, supra note 164, at 2. However, Canadian environmental statutes are typically
provincial. Id. at 2, 3.
236. See, e.g., Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of Environment), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624,
641.
237. Although no clear conflicts between the laws of the two countries emerge, British Colum-
bia nonetheless argued in its Brief in Support of Teck Cominco's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
that application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco would "harm[] comity" by ignoring the bilateral
tradition of cooperation. Brief of British Columbia, supra note 164, at 3, 12.
238. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006). The
Pakootas court did not give any international policy bases for its decision. See id.
239. See Parrish, supra note 21, at 409-14.
240. See id. at 410; David G. Lemarquand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United
States Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221, 223 (1986); John E. Carroll, Water Resources
Management as an Issue in Environmental Diplomacy, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207,213 (1986).
241. For example, upon Teck Cominco's Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for a Writ of
Certiorari, the following groups filed supporting amicus briefs: the National Mining Association, the
Consumer Electronics Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Canadian Mining As-
sociation. Pakootas, 452 F.3d 1066. Furthermore, before and during the litigation of this matter at
the trial level, American industries expressed concern about possible retaliatory litigation from Ca-
nadian plaintiffs. See, e.g., Letter from Jack N. Gerard, President & CEO, Nat'l Mining Assoc., to
Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., and Michael 0. Leavitt, Adm'r, E.P.A.
(Apr. 22, 2004), http://www.law.washington.edu/directory/docs/Robinson-DornTrailSmelter/do
cs/22APR2004GerardofNMAtoPowelletal.pdf; Letter from Thomas R. Kuhn, President, Edison
Elec. Inst., to Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, and Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant Att'y Gen. for




stances to enforce U.S. judgments against Canada,242 Canada is also leery
about allowing infringements on its own sovereignty.243
By characterizing the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco as
domestic rather than extraterritorial, the Pakootas court effectively cab-
ined the threat of future extraterritorial applications of U.S. environ-
mental law across the border. By focusing on CERCLA's specific statu-
tory language and the narrow facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit decision
created no precedent that another court could use to justify future expan-
sions of U.S. environmental law.
The risk of reciprocity, however, is not an insubstantial specter; it
would have been a valid concern for the Ninth Circuit in deciding the
Pakootas case. This risk, then, provides at least some justification for
the court's choice to characterize the application of CERCLA to Teck
Cominco as domestic rather than extraterritorial. However, the risk of
reciprocity should not have stopped the court from applying CERCLA
extraterritorially to Teck Cominco. Even if Canadian courts were to re-
taliate by applying their own statutes to U.S. defendants, such reciprocal
extraterritoriality might encourage both nations to work together to cre-
ate an effective bilateral dispute resolution system.
C. Problems with the Existing International
Dispute Resolution Paradigm
The United States and Canada share a long history of solving their
transboundary pollution problem through bilateral negotiations and arbi-
tration, but this history has not resulted in a viable dispute resolution sys-
tem until today. In 1909, the two countries signed the Boundary Waters
Treaty ("Treaty"). 244 Although originally created to address a different
but parallel concern,245 the Treaty provides that boundary waters "shall
not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the
other., 246 The Treaty also created the International Joint Commission
242. See, e.g., United States v. Ivey, [1991126 O.R.3d 533.
243. Arthur T. Downey, Extraterritorial Sanctions in the Canada/U.S. Context - A U.S. Per-
spective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 215, 215 (1998). In Ivey, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal ac-
knowledged that the recovery of costs by the United States for its remediation of the waste site left
by the defendants did not "represent an illegitimate attempt to assert sovereignty beyond its bor-
ders." 26 O.R.3d at 549. For the general facts of Ivey, see supra note 217.
244. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit.
(for Can.), Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
245. The Treaty's primary purpose was to "ensure the equitable sharing of boundary waters
between Canada and the United States." Jennifer Woodward, International Pollution Control: The
United States and Canada: The International Joint Commission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
325, 326 (1988) (citing the Int'l Joint Comm'n, Sixth Annual Report on Water Quality 10 (1978)).
246. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 244, art. IV, 36 Stat. at 2450. This provision repre-
sents a compromise; Canada wanted a provision prohibiting all pollution which could have trans-
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(IJC), to keep a watchful eye on the boundary waters between the coun-
tries. 247 The IJC is composed of six members-three from the United
States and three from Canada. The Treaty confers upon the IJC, among
other things, jurisdiction to hear cases involving boundary water pollu-
tion.24' Although the IJC has jurisdiction, its decisions are not binding;
they are only advisory. Therefore, the two countries may use the deci-
249sion as a starting point for negotiations and reach their own settlement.
The Pakootas case arises from the same smelter that was the nu-
cleus of one of the most famous cases of international arbitration: the
Trail Smelter Arbitration. 250 Even today, that arbitration is the "only de-
cision of an international court or tribunal that deals specifically, and on
the merits, with transfrontier pollution., 25' Beginning in the late nine-
teenth century and continuing through the 1930s, the Consolidated Min-
ing and Smelting Company (later shortened to "Cominco") produced
clouds of sulfur dioxide through its lead and zinc smelting. 252 These
emissions resulted in damage to farm and timberlands on both sides of
the border.253 Although the Canadian claims were quickly settled, the
American claims caused more problems, eventually leading the two
countries to submit hundreds of claims to the IJC. 254 After receiving mil-
lions in dollars in claims, the IJC recommended a total award of
$350,000, which the United States immediately.25 5 After two years of
continuing discussions, the two countries decided to submit their dispute
to a three-member arbitration panel.256 Finally, in 1941, the panel used
both U.S. and international law to generate a fundamental principle of
transboundary pollution law:
No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious con-
boundary consequences, but the United States refused, preferring a far narrower provision. This
compromise was achieved when Canada reassured the United States that the provision would be
enforced only in serious cases. Woodward, supra note 245, at 327.
247. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 244, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
248. Id., art. IX, 36 Stat. at 2452.
249. Id.
250. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938), reprinted in 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. 684 (1941).
251. Hall, supra note 1, at 696 (quoting EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 257 (1998)).
252. Id. at 697; Robinson-Dorn, supra note 26, at 247-50.
253. Hall, supra note 1, at 697; Robinson-Dorn, supra note 26, at 246-47.
254. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 26, at 249.
255. Id. at 250.
256. Id. at 251.
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sequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.257
Applying this principle, the panel found that Canada was responsi-
ble for the actions of Trail Smelter, and required Trail Smelter to "refrain
from causing any damage through fumes in the state of Washington. 258
In addition to the original $350,000 recommended by the IJC for the
damage through 1932, the tribunal granted $78,000 for damage accruing
from 1932 through 1937.59 Moreover, the tribunal permitted the Trail
Smelter to continue a strictly regulated operation and made provisions in
the event of further damage to Washington residents.26°
The Trail Smelter arbitration, through its application of the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty, has served as a model for the adjudication of disputes
of this type. However, for the IJC to issue a binding judgment, each na-
tion must voluntarily submit.261 For the United States, such a submission
requires approval by the Senate.262 In the history of the IJC, neither the
United States nor Canada has ever submitted a dispute to the IJC for a
binding judgment.263 Thus, even though submission of the present dis-
pute to the IJC would be a method of resolving the dispute by which both
countries' environmental laws and interests would be considered, 264 it is
unlikely that the United States would ever consent to submitting the dis-
pute for binding arbitration. The most the parties could hope for from
the IJC would be an advisory opinion.
Nonetheless, the IJC can effectively kindle negotiations between
the United States and Canada. The IJC has been actively involved in
another recent transboundary concern: the pollution of the Great
Lakes.265 In 1964, because of growing concern over the water quality in
Lakes Erie and Ontario, the United States and Canada jointly referred the
problem to the IJC.2 6 6 After almost seven years of investigations and
deliberations, the IJC reported high levels of pollutants such as phospho-
257. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1965 (1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter
11].
258. Id. at 1966.
259. Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 252.
260. Trail Smelter II, supra note 257, at 1966-81.
261. Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 252.
262. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 244, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
263. Hall, supra note 1, at 706.
264. See Parrish, supra note 21, at 420-21; see also Brief of British Columbia, supra note 164,
at 14.
265. See INT'L JOINT COMM'N, U.S.-CAN., 13TH BIENNIAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY (2006), http://www.ijc.org/php/publieations/pdf/ID1601.pdf.
266. Hall, supra note 1, at 711.
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267rus and bacteria. Among its proposals were the suggestions that the
two countries create programs to achieve the water quality objectives set
forth by the IJC and that they enter into an agreement not only to achieve
those objectives but also to take a fully cooperative approach to pollution
in the Lakes generally.268 After two more years of negotiation, the first
version of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) was
signed in 1972,269 to be replaced in coming years by several revisions.270
Although the GLWQA has been described as the broadest agree-
ment "ever signed by two governments in the environmental field ,,271 its
implementation has been hampered by its advisory status and its lack of
enforcement provisions. 72 In a situation like the one that instigated the
Pakootas case, the injured parties would have to be prepared to wait
years for a recommendation by the IJC. Even then, previous efforts by
citizens to enforce the GLWQA in court have been unsuccessful.273
Therefore, the GLWQA has not provided an effective means of provid-
ing compensation for environmentally injured parties in the Great Lakes
274region.
A more recent tribunal also exists to resolve transboundary envi-
ronmental disputes. The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation 275 (NAAEC) is a trilateral agreement among the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, intended to address regional environmental
concerns, particularly those related to the implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.276
267. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, U.S.-CAN., POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER 89-93 (1970), http://www.ijc.org/php/pub
lications/pdf/ID364.pdf.
268. Id.
269. Hall, supra note 1, at 711.
270. Int'l Joint Comm'n, U.S.-Can., The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the
United States of America and Canada, http://www.ijc.org/en/activities/consu ltations/glwqa/guide_3.
php.
271. Id.
272. Hall, supra note 1, at 712.
273. See Lake Erie Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (W.D. Pa.
1981); see also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
274. Nonetheless, the The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has served as an important
example of the two countries working together in pursuit of a common end. The agreement provides
citizens with a greater participatory role than they would otherwise have in maintaining the water
quality of the Lakes, and this role ensures increased accountability of the two countries' govern-
ments to act in accordance with their responsibilities under the GLWQA. See Hall, supra note 1, at
713-14.
275. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art. 14,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
276. See COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: STRATEGIC PLAN OF
THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 2005-2010, at 4 (2005), http://www.cec
.org/files/PDF/ABOUTUS/2005-201 0-Strategic-plan en.pdf.
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NAAEC, in turn, established the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which was created "to facilitate ef-
fective cooperation on the conservation, protection, and enhancement of
the North American environment., 27 7 The CEC is composed principally
of three institutions: the Council (composed of cabinet-level officials
from each country), the Secretariat (the administrative staff of the CEC),
and the Joint Public Advisory Committee (composed of five citizens
from each country, brought in to advise the CEC).278 As a part of its
functions, the CEC accepts petitions-from either governments or pri-
vate parties-asserting that one of the member governments is failing to
enforce its environmental laws effectively.
2 79
Like other international tribunals, however, CEC's procedures are
complex and time-consuming. 28 0 In addition, even if the CEC's Secre-
tariat accepts the petition and agrees to issue a factual record, no legal
enforcement mechanism exists. 28  This combination of intimidating pro-
cedural hurdles and limited legal muscle may account why only three
citizen submissions have been made since the CEC's inception in
1993.282 Thus, where domestic litigation remedies exist, and where
timely remediation is vital, the CEC does not provide a viable option for
environmentally injured citizens.
At present, no accessible mechanism exists by which private liti-
gants can submit a claim for transboundary pollution to an international
tribunal for a binding judgment. Although there is hope that this will
change, no solution is immediately foreseeable. Thus, for the Pakootas
plaintiffs, a shorter-term remedy was necessary to ensure that the envi-
277. Id.
278. ld. at 5.
279. Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm: International Environ-
mental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 VA. INT'L L. 1, 13-14 (2007);
Du Bey & Sascrainte, supra note 18, at 363.
280. If the petition meets the requirements for a submission, the Secretariat may then choose to
request a response from the accused government. Hall, supra note 1, at 719. In making this deci-
sion, the Secretariat considers whether domestic remedies have first been pursued. Id. After the
accused government has replied, the Secretariat considers both the petition and the government's
response before advising the Council whether a "factual record" should be prepared. Id. The final
decision whether to pursue the matter lies with the Council, which must approve the petition by a
two-thirds majority. Id. This majority requirement means that the petition must ultimately be ap-
proved in part by officials from the accused government. Id. at 719-20.
281. See id. at 723; Du Bey & Sanscrainte, supra note 18, at 363.
282. For two of these, the Secretariat ultimately refused to issue a factual record. Hall, supra
note 1, at 720-21. The third submission was made in March of 2006 and concerned the United
States' and Canada's obligations to enforce the Boundary Waters Treaty and prevent the pollution of
transboundary waters in the diversion of water from Devil's Lake in North Dakota into Lake Winni-
peg. Id.
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ronmental injury to the Columbia River and Lake Roosevelt was ade-
quately redressed.
D. The Ninth Circuit's Lost Opportunity
Although the Ninth Circuit's reluctance in Pakootas to deviate from
Subafilms is understandable, a different approach would have provided
the plaintiffs with the same remedy while also clarifying Ninth Circuit
law on extraterritoriality. The court could have remained true to Ninth
Circuit precedent while also correctly holding that the application of
CERCLA to Teck Cominco was extraterritorial.283 The court could then
have used the effects exceptions to rebut the territoriality presumption.
Though the effects exception is not an effective long-term solution to the
problem of transboundary pollution, it is a workable short-term strategy
to provide redress to injured plaintiffs while hopefully prompting nations
to reconsider existing international dispute mechanisms.
1. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Adopted and Applied
the Effects Exception
After concluding that application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco
was extraterritorial, the Ninth Circuit would then have had to determine
whether use of the effects exception was appropriate. With thorough
analysis, this would have been a simple task. Under Subafilms, the court
could have determined that the plaintiffs had no alternative remedies,
that the congressional intent behind CERCLA is inconclusive, and that
application of the statute would be consistent with international com-
ity. 284 By taking this analytical route, the court would have positioned
itself to adopt or reject the effects exception, thereby clarifying Ninth
Circuit law.
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted the effects exception. Al-
though Supreme Court precedent is inconsistent, recent opinions suggest
that the exception still has a place in federal jurisprudence. 85 In addi-
tion, despite criticism of the effects exception,286 there is hope that courts
might craft and refine some type of "reasonableness" inquiry to constrain
unwarranted assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.287 The Pakootas
283. See discussion supra Parts IILA, lV.A.
284. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
285. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.b.
286. See generally Parrish, supra note 107.
287. Although a Timberlane-style analysis might initially promote uncertainty due to its exten-
sive weighing of factors, such a test could, over time, be refined and narrowed so that judicial goals
of predictability might be furthered alongside interests of fairness.
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case was an inviting opportunity for the Ninth Circuit to begin creating
just such an inquiry, and the court should have taken the bait.
2. The Effects Exception Provides an Effective Short-Term Solution
The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not an advisable long-term
strategy, but it is an effective short-term solution. The two nations pres-
ently have no viable international dispute resolution system. The will-
ingness of the United States and Canada to avoid disputes and engage in
bilateral cooperation has withered in recent years.288 The countries have
bypassed treaties and have stopped utilizing the IJC to resolve dis-
putes. 289 Recent disputes between the two nations, including the Pa-
kootas controversy, have become prolonged and contentious. 290 This
decline in bilateral cooperation has been blamed to some extent on the
isolationist tendencies of the U.S. federal government, reflecting not only
the U.S. approach towards its relations with Canada, but also its attitude
toward international law generally.
291
This soured relationship, combined with the ineffectiveness of the
relevant international tribunals, creates an unaccommodating atmosphere
for injured private citizens hoping to use international dispute resolution
procedures. To encourage both environmental protection and timely
compensation or remediation for injured citizens, the time is ripe to use
domestic litigation to effect transboundary environmental change.292
The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction will result in positive short-
term results. 293 The application of domestic environmental law to a re-
sponsible foreign party permits the injured party relatively timely reme-
diation, at the responsible party's expense. Such an outcome would be
unattainable if the injured party were limited to international dispute
resolution mechanisms such as the IJC or CEC.29 4 In addition, this use of
domestic environmental law provides enforceable environmental protec-
288. Parrish, supra note 279, at 14-15.
289. Id.
290. Id. In addition to the Pakootas case, other bilateral disputes have cropped up along the
border. The water pollution dispute over Devil's Lake has been "nasty" and has created "political
turmoil." Id. at 15-16. Recent disputes range from "the closing of the U.S. border to Canadian beef
and the softwood lumber impasse, to U.S. allegations of lax Canadian immigration laws and security
at airports and other points of entry, [and] the disputes over cross border waterways." Id. at 15. For
a recent discussion of the softwood lumber dispute and its effect on relations between the United
States and Canada, see Sarah E. Lysons, Comment, Resolving the Softwood Lumber Dispute, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407 (2009).
291. Id. at 20.
292. See id. at 57-63; Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 316-17.
293. See Parrish, supra note 279, at 57; Robinson-Dom, supra note 26, at 316-17.
294. See supra Part IV.C.
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tion where such protection would otherwise be insufficient.2 95 Although
the United States, as the producer of much of the pollution at the U.S.-
Canadian border,2 96 may be loathe to risk reciprocity, private suits would
nonetheless provide a tangible environmental benefit on both sides of the
international border.29 7
In addition to these short-term benefits, the use of domestic litiga-
tion may result in tangible long-term benefits as well. The use of trans-
boundary environmental litigation-by both U.S. and Canadian plain-
tiffs-would prompt the governments of the two countries to reconsider
the value of bilateral negotiations.298 If Canada indeed reciprocated by
suing U.S. industries for their polluting, U.S. policy-makers would have
299a renewed incentive to seek alternative solutions to litigation. Such an
incentive could result in renewed bilateral negotiations and perhaps even
serve to strengthen the existing international dispute resolution sys-
tems. 3°° In this sense, while existing dispute resolution mechanisms plod
along, making few waves, domestic litigation may act like a shock to the
system and instigate considerable change.
301
For domestic litigation of transboundary harm to have the desired
effect, some common-sense principles of extraterritorial statutory appli-
cation must be established. If the effects exception is adopted, it should
be tempered by the requirement that courts consider issues of interna-
tional comity. Vague rules and inconsistently applied statutes will result
in nothing more than free-for-all litigation, with few guidelines and even
fewer principles at play. Courts on both sides of the border should pay
attention the other's evolving law. Efforts should be made to avoid un-
necessary intrusions on the other nation's sovereignty. Above all, how-
ever, courts should keep in mind the ultimate objective: the equal protec-
tion of both nations' environments. If and when courts take these princi-
ples to heart, an international judicial dialogue can develop and help pre-
serve the place we all call home.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals,
Ltd. stands as a symbol of what might have been. The opinion might
have been one of the most important and influential transboundary pollu-
295. See Robinson-Dorn, supra note 26, at 316-17.
296. See discussion, supra Part IV.B.
297. See Robinson-Dorn, supra note 26, at 316-17.
298. See Parrish, supra note 279, at 58-59.
299. Id.
300. Robinson-Dor, supra note 26, at 317-19.
301. Id.
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tion cases in decades. The decision might have clarified the Ninth Cir-
cuit's position on the extraterritorial application of domestic statutes. It
might even have taken a substantial step toward a wholesale renovation
of existing bilateral dispute resolution mechanisms.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit Court hedged its bets. Perhaps unwilling
to renounce Subafilms, the court obscured the issue of extraterritoriality
by concluding that the application of CERCLA to Teck Cominco was
merely domestic.302 This decision failed to clarify the Ninth Circuit's
case law, which might have played a vital role in the development of an
international judicial dialogue on the application of environmental stat-
utes. In future decisions in which the Ninth Circuit faces the question of
extraterritoriality, the court should boldly define the circuit's position on
the doctrine. Only by taking such a step will the extraterritoriality doc-
trine-both in the Ninth Circuit and nationwide-be clarified.
302. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
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